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A: We consider a planner who chooses between two possi-
ble public policies and ask whether a referendum or a cost beneﬁt
analysis leads to higher welfare. We ﬁnd that a referendum leads to
higher welfare than a cost beneﬁt analyses in “common value” envi-
ronments. Cost beneﬁt analysis is better in “private value” environ-
ments.
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Many collective decisions are made on the basis of either a referendum or a cost-
beneﬁt analysis. We study the efﬁcacy of these two decision-making methods in
an environment in which individuals’ preferences and information may differ.
Two factors determine which method is superior: the importance of pref-
erence differences relative to information differences, and the extent to which
individuals behave strategically. The maintained assumption of most cost ben-
eﬁt analyses is that each subject truthfully reveals her preferences. Under this
assumption and the assumption that individuals vote strategically, cost bene-
ﬁt analyses and referenda differ in two signiﬁcant respects. First, a cost beneﬁt
analysis is better at eliciting cardinal information about preferences than is a ref-
erendum. Second, strategic behavior may lead only well-informed individuals
to vote in a referendum, whereas no such self-selection occurs in a cost-beneﬁt
analysis. These differences imply that the outcome of a cost beneﬁt analysis
is superior when individuals have diverse preferences but similar information,
whereas the outcome of a referendum is superior individuals have similar pref-
erences but different information.
We study environments in which the decision to be made is binary. We say
that an environment has ‘private values’ if each individual knows her valuation
for each decision and these valuations differ, and has ‘common values’ if the in-
dividuals’valuationsarethesamebutunknown. Withthisterminology,ourmain
result may be stated simply and precisely: given truthful revelation by the sub-
jects of a cost beneﬁt analysis and strategic behavior by voters, the outcome of
a cost beneﬁt analysis is superior to that of a referendum in a private value en-
vironment, whereas the outcome of a referendum is superior to that of a cost
beneﬁt analysis in a common value environment.
This result hinges on agents behaving differently in the two mechanisms: it
requires strategic voting in referenda but truthful revelation of preferences in
cost beneﬁt analyses. This assumption is easy to defend for a cost beneﬁt anal-
ysis based on revealed preference information such as housing prices or travel
costs, but is more problematic for a cost beneﬁt analysis relying on stated pref-
erence methods. We ﬁnd that if agents approach cost beneﬁt analyses with the
samesophisticationthattheyapplytoreferenda,thetwomechanismsareequiv-
alent.
Even without taking a position on the extent to which agents behave strate-
gically when participating in a cost beneﬁt analysis, we can make a strong state-
ment about the comparative advantages of cost beneﬁt analyses and referenda:
a cost beneﬁt analysis is at least as good as a referendum in a ‘private value’ en-
vironment, whereas the converse is true in a ‘common value’ environment. For
1reasons we discuss below, we are inclined to give some credence to the widely
maintained assumption of truthful revelation in cost-beneﬁt analyses, even in
those relying on stated preference methods. In this case, cost beneﬁt analysis is
strictly preferred to referenda in private value environments, and conversely in
common value environments.
2. Background: cost beneﬁt analyses and referenda
Executive Order 12866 of the US government requires that “Each agency shall
assess both the costs and the beneﬁts of ... regulation ...” (Clinton, 1993). Simi-
larly, the US Ofﬁce of Management and Budget is required to submit to congress
“an estimate of the costs and beneﬁts of Federal rules and paperwork ...” each
year.1 Several major US regulations also mandate measurement of the beneﬁts
and costs of regulation. In addition, as of 1996, 10 states required an analysis of
the beneﬁts and costs of regulation (Hahn, 2000).
Given these directives, it is unsurprising that cost beneﬁt analyses are often
used to evaluate public policy and that these analyses appear to inﬂuence reg-
ulators in favor of policies that generate higher estimated beneﬁts at lower es-
timated costs. For example, Cropper et al. (1992) provide evidence that the US
Environmental Protection Agency’s decisions to regulate dangerous pesticides
are inﬂuenced by estimates of the costs and beneﬁts of the pesticide in question.
Smith (2000) provides anecdotal evidence that cost beneﬁt analysis has affected
air quality regulation for the Grand Canyon. Viscusi (1996) argues that the US
DepartmentofTransportationbegantopursueregulationswithlargerestimated
net beneﬁts after it incorporated cost beneﬁt analysis into its decision process.
This evidence suggests that many important allocation decisions are made,
roughly, according to a ‘cost beneﬁt decision rule’ that operates in two steps:
measure the costs and beneﬁts of a proposed action and then choose the ac-
tion if and only if the net beneﬁt is positive. Indeed, this stylized decision rule
is broadly consistent with the injunction of Executive Order 12866 to “propose
or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the beneﬁts of
the intended regulation justify its costs” (Clinton, 1993), with similar mandates
present in many state laws (Hahn, 2000), and with the exhortations of profes-
sional economists (e.g. Arrow et al. 1996).2
Estimating the costs and beneﬁts of public policies is not trivial. But econo-
mists have responded to the problem with considerable ingenuity, and many
1FY2001 Treasury and Government Appropriations Act, §624.
2Note that each of these sources also allows for the possibility that factors other than the costs
and beneﬁts of a policy, e.g., distributional implications, should inﬂuence the chosen policy.
2techniquesarenowavailable. Ofthese,thethreemostcommonarestatedprefer-
ence methods, travel cost methods, and hedonic analysis. We develop a stylized
description of stated preference cost beneﬁt analysis and discuss later the extent
to which our intuition applies to the travel cost and hedonic methods.
The stated preference method draws a sample from the affected population
and asks each respondent to reveal information about the beneﬁt they would
derive from a particular policy. The concept is simple, but the method often in-
volves sophisticated survey techniques. For example, stated preference surveys
often describe policies and their consequences in detail, elicit demographic in-
formation, debrief respondents to assess their understanding of the questions
(Hanemann 1994, Arrow et al. 1993), and even allow for the possibility that
agents’ responses violate the axioms of revealed preference (Settle et al. 2003,
Cherry et al. 2003).
Referenda are another important mechanism for collective decision-making.
Aside from their pervasive use in choosing government ofﬁcials, they are also
widely used to resolve questions that might otherwise be left to regulators.3 For
example, in California alone, 2004 saw some 16 state level referendum measures
on topics ranging from health care to gambling to criminal law (State of Califor-
nia, November, 2004). All of these decisions could have been made on the basis
of cost beneﬁt analyses.4
Giventheprevalenceandapparentinterchangeabilityofcostbeneﬁtanalysis
and referenda, it is natural to ask when one mechanism should be preferred to
another.5 We seek to answer this question.






Agent types: T ={0,1,i,u}.
3Lupia (1994) reports that in 2004 more than 70% of the  population lived in jurisdictions
where referenda were used in this way. He also reports widespread use of referenda in Europe.
4Choosing government ofﬁcials by cost beneﬁt analysis may seem odd, but is almost certainly
practical. If we identify a candidate for ofﬁce with a bundle of policies and attributes, the choice
problem could be resolved by a cost beneﬁt analysis.
5DiamondandHausman(1994)callforarelatedcalculation: acomparisonofdecisionsmade
with and without cost beneﬁt analysis.
3Agents of types 0 and 1 are partisans who respectively prefer policies 0 and 1 in
both states of the world. Agents of type i and u are independents who prefer the
policy to match the state. Agents of type i know the state (are informed) whereas
agentsoftypeu donot(areuninformed); uninformedagentslearnthestateonly
after a policy is chosen. Denote the fraction of each type t in the population by
pt.
Weassumethattheplayers’preferencesarerepresentedbythefollowingpay-
off functions, with π0 ≥0 and π1 ≥0.
Type 0 (0-partisans):
¨
−π0 if x =1




0 if x =1
−π1 if x =0
for z =0,1
Types i and u (independents):
¨
0 if x =z
−1 if x 6=z.
The probability of state 0 is α, with α <
1
2, and this probability is common
knowledge for the agents and planner. All agents are expected payoff maximiz-
ers.
Given these payoffs, the values of moving from policy 0 to policy 1 for each





1 in state 1
−1 in state 0
Uninformed independents: 1−2α
Note that 1−2α>0 by our assumption that α<
1
2.
As a benchmark, we measure welfare by summing the payoffs of all agents.
The per capita welfare gain associated with moving from policy 0 to policy 1 is
w0 ≡−π0p0+π1p1−pi −pu in state 0 (1)
and
w1 ≡−π0p0+π1p1+pi +pu in state 1. (2)
In state z the ﬁrst best action is thus to change from policy 0 to policy 1 if wz >0.
We restrict the formal analysis to the two polar cases. In the pure private val-
ues case, all agents are partisans (pi = pu = 0); in the pure common values case,
4all agents are independents (p0 = p1 = 0). That is, in the case of pure private
values, agents disagree about the best policy because their tastes differ. In the
common values case, agents are in perfect agreement about the best policy con-
ditional on the state, but some do not know the state.
Manysocialchoicesinvolvecommonvalues. Forexample,mostpeopleagree
that high incomes, a pleasant environment, high security, and a steady supply of
Chilean Sea Bass are desirable goals. They disagree about how to achieve these
goals, at least in part because they are uncertain of the “state of the world”. In
the more mundane decision-making environments of choosing a restaurant or a
vacation destination, the purpose of guidebooks is to provide information about
the state of the world, on the premise that people can beneﬁt by relying on the
author’s assessment of an unfamiliar good.
In a common value environment as we have formulated it, a simple method
for selecting the ﬁrst-best policy exists: delegate the decision to an informed
agent. The difﬁculty with this method is of course that in most environments
some partisans are present, and they have no incentive to reveal themselves,
making it impossible for a planner to reliably identify an informed agent to
whom to delegate the decision.6
4. Cost beneﬁt analysis
As we have mentioned, our model of cost beneﬁt analysis captures the stated
preference method. Estimates derived from stated preference methods gener-
ally rest on the assumption that the sample of respondents is representative of
the population (at least on the basis of unobservable characteristics). In fact,
since a high non-response rate creates the possibility of sampling bias, Arrow
et al. (1993) give a high non-response rate as a reason for discounting the con-
clusions of a stated preference survey. Stated preference analyses usually also
posit that survey respondents are truthful. The exceptions to this assumption
seem to prove the rule. For example, Carson et al. (2000) contemplate the possi-
bility of strategic responses to stated preference questions, but their objective is
to formulate questions to which strategic responses will result in truthful revela-
tion.
Like many aspects of stated preference methods, the extent to which agents
respond to survey questions strategically is contentious. In order to avoid taking
a position on this issue, we conduct our analysis of cost beneﬁt analysis under
both of the competing assumptions: that agents naïvely reveal their private in-
6This problem of partisans masquerading as informed independents is essentially the same
problem as the studied in Banerjee and Somanathan (2001).
5formation, and that agents report their values strategically.
We assume that the analyst conducting a cost beneﬁt analysis is able to elicit
each individual’s precise valuation of the policy change in question. While this
assumption is arguably consistent with travel cost or hedonic methods, it ap-
pears to be at variance with accepted best practice in stated preference meth-
ods. The state of the art in stated preference methods calls for the elicitation of
bounds for an individual’s valuation (Hanemann, 1994). The assumption that
the analyst conducting the cost beneﬁt analysis is able to elicit each individual’s
precise valuation of the policy change assumption is therefore probably too fa-
vorable to stated preference methods.
Inthecontextofourmodel, acostbeneﬁtanalysisofpolicy1beginsbydraw-
ing a sample of k agents at random from the population of n affected agents.
In practice, k is less than n, so that the cost beneﬁt analysis is subject to sam-
pling error. Since referenda and cost beneﬁt analyses generally draw different
sized samples, the issue of sampling error is important when comparing the two
decision-making methods. With this said, an analysis of sampling errors is a dis-
traction from the intuition we are trying to develop, so we abstract from it by
assuming k =n.
Insummary, weassumethatacostbeneﬁtanalysisproceedsasfollows. First,
for each affected agent i ∈ {1,...,n}, the planner elicits a report ri of the value
thattheagentplacesonthechangefrompolicy0topolicy1. Second,theplanner
sumsallreceivedreports. Finally,ifthissumispositivetheplanneradoptspolicy
1, and if it is negative the planner adopts policy 0. If the sum of received reports
is zero, the planner chooses a policy by tossing a fair coin.7
4.1 Cost beneﬁt analysis with naïve reporting
When agents report naïvely, the planner elicits the sum of the agents’ expected
valuesofachangefrompolicy0topolicy1,giventheirinformation. Uninformed
independents believe that the state is 0 with probability α, in which case their
value of the policy change is −1, and that the state is 1 with probability 1−α, in
which case their value of the policy change is 1. Hence they report an expected
value of 1−2α. Informed independents report −1 in state 0 and 1 in state 1; 0-
partisans report −π0 and 1-partisans report π1 independent of the state. Thus
the per capita reported value of the change from policy 0 to policy 1 is
v0 ≡−π0p0+π1p1−pi +(1−2α)pu in state 0
7It is probably more sensible to imagine the policy maker choosing with a toss of a fair coin in
private value environments, and acting on the common prior to choose 1 in common value en-
vironments. The present assumption eases exposition by keeping the two types of environment
symmetric.
6and
v1 ≡−π0p0+π1p1+pi +(1−2α)pu in state 1.




rect decision. In state 1, informed agents report positive signals and uninformed
agentsreporttheexpectedvalueofmovingfrompolicy0to1. Sincebothtypesof
agents submit qualitatively correct reports, the sum of these reports is also qual-
itatively correct and leads to a correct policy choice. However, v0, unlike w0, may
be positive, so that in state 0 cost beneﬁt analysis may yield the wrong decision.
This occurs if pi <(1−2α)pu. In state 0, informed agents make qualitatively cor-
rect negative reports, but uninformed agents make the same positive reports as
they do in state 1, and these reports are now qualitatively incorrect. Thus if un-
informed agentsare sufﬁciently numerous, thesum of reportsis positive andthe
cost beneﬁt decision rule incorrectly chooses policy 1.
For a pure private value problem (pi = pu = 0), we have vz = wz, the true
per capita welfare gain (see (1) and (2)). In this case, cost beneﬁt analysis simply
collects the information necessary to make the correct welfare calculation and
thus always selects the welfare-maximizing policy.
The following result summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 1 Consider cost beneﬁt analysis with naïve reporting.
(a) (Pure common values) Suppose that p0 = p1 = 0. The correct (welfare-
maximizing) policy is chosen in state 1 (the more likely state) and is cho-
sen in state 0 if pi > (1 − 2α)pu. The wrong policy is chosen in state 0 if
pi <(1−2α)pu.
(b) (Pure private values) Suppose that pi = pu = 0. The correct (welfare-maxi-
mizing) policy is always chosen.
4.2 Cost beneﬁt analysis with strategic reporting
4.2.1 Costbeneﬁtanalysisasagame Supposethateachagentactsstrategically
when reporting her beneﬁt from switching from policy 0 to policy 1. Allow each
agent either to report some number from the interval [−B,B], where B is a large
positive number, or not to submit a report. That is, let the set of actions for each
agent be {φ}∪[−B,B], where φ represents nonparticipation. By bounding the
set of permissible reports we are implicitly assuming that the survey administra-
tor has a prior about the range of possible values and either rejects or truncates
7responses that are unreasonably large or unreasonably small.8 Since nonpartici-
pationisequivalenttoreportingzero,wecanrestrictagentstoreportsin[−B,B].
These assumptions deﬁne a simple Bayesian game with two states; each in-
formed independent knows the state, whereas each uninformed independent
does not. (Partisans’ payoffs are independent of the state, so it does not matter
whether they know the state.) A strategy rj for an informed independent j is a
function that associates reports rj(0) and rj(1) with the two states. A strategy rj
for any other agent j is simply a report.
This game has many Nash equilibria. To ﬁx ideas, consider the pure com-
mon value game. This game has a Nash equilibrium in which all agents report
B regardless of their types and another equilibrium in which all agents report
−B regardless of their types. In each case, no deviation by any agent affects the
outcome (given that there are at least three agents).
These equilibria are unappealing because in each equilibrium each agent
has actions different from her equilibrium action that are equally attractive if
the other agents adhere to their equilibrium actions and more attractive if some
agents deviate from their equilibrium actions. We focus on deviations to non-
participation. Suppose that when choosing an action, each agent considers the
possibilitythateachoftheotheragentsmayexogenouslybepreventedfrompar-
ticipating (e.g. because a phone rings, a child cries, or a doorbell breaks). Specif-
ically, suppose that each agent assumes that every other agent will be prevented
from participating with small independent probability. Then, when choosing a
strategy, each agent ﬁrst limits herself to strategies that are optimal when all the
other agents adhere to their strategies, and then, within this set, chooses on the
basis of the performance of the strategies when some agents do not participate.
Because the probability of a small number of nonparticipants is much higher
than the probability of a large number, each agent gives most weight in her strat-
egy choice to situations in which the number of nonparticipants is small. But if
two of her strategies perform equally well when the number of nonparticipants
is small, she then compares the strategies in the case that the number of nonpar-
ticipants is large.
In the equilibrium in which each type of each agent chooses B, an informed
agent who knows the state is 0 is better off switching to −B if enough of the other
agents are prevented from participating (in which case her switch changes the
policy to 0 in state 0), and is never worse off switching to −B. The action B for an
uninformed agent is not unambiguously dominated,9 but the action 0 is better if
8One of the functions of the ‘closed-ended questions’ discussed in Hanemann (1994) is to
impose such bounds.
9If no other agent participates, B (which yields policy 1 in both states) is better than 0 (which
yields each policy with probability
1
2 in each state).
8the number of nonparticipants is just small enough to cause the switch from B
to 0 to make a difference, and is thus inconsistent with equilibrium when each
agent is prevented from participating with a small enough probability.
Precisely, we deﬁne an equilibrium as follows.10 Deﬁne the ε-perturbation of
a strategy proﬁle r to be the strategy proﬁle in which each player j chooses rj
with probability 1−ε and 0 (nonparticipation) with probability ε.
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle r is an equilibrium if there exists ε > 0 such that
for all ε<ε, the strategy rj of each agent j is a best response to the ε-perturbation
of r.
The Nash equilibrium that we consider above in which every agent reports B
is not an equilibrium in this sense. When all agents report B, a deviation by an
agent affects the outcome only if the number of other participants is zero or one;
in both cases, an informed independent is better off deviating to −B in state 0,




2 mixture of policies
0 and 1 or from policy 1 to policy 0. Thus for any small positive probability that
each agent involuntarily does not participate, the deviation is proﬁtable, so that
the strategy proﬁle is not an equilibrium.
4.2.2 Equilibrium in the cost beneﬁt analysis game
Common values To understand equilibrium in the case of pure common val-
ues, it is useful to recall the intuition developed in Feddersen and Pesendorfer
(1996)forequilibriaofreferendaincommonvalueenvironments. Consideraref-
erendum with only two agents, both independents, one informed and one not.
For the informed agent, voting for the policy that matches the state weakly dom-
inates her other actions (abstain and vote for the policy different from the state).
Given that the informed agent votes for the policy that matches the state, the un-
informed agent’s vote affects the outcome only when it differs from that of the
informed voter. In this case, the uninformed voter changes the outcome from
the policy that matches the state to a tie between the policies, so that the un-
informed agent’s vote is unambiguously detrimental. Therefore the uninformed
voter is best off abstaining. It follows that the outcome of the referendum is de-
termined by the informed voter and coincides with outcome that would occur if
both agents were informed and voted sincerely.
10This deﬁnition is similar in spirit to the deﬁnition of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of
the strategic game in which each type of each player in the Bayesian game is a different player.
It differs in that only perturbations to nonparticipation, rather than arbitrary perturbations, are
considered, and the probability ε is assumed to be the same for all agents. It is related also to the
assumption of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996) that the number of agents is random.
9The intuition behind equilibrium behavior in the common value cost bene-
ﬁt analysis game is similar. Uninformed independents want to choose reports
that are not pivotal, and thus choose small reports. Informed agents want to
inﬂuence the collective decision so that the policy matches the state, and thus
choose reports that are large relative to those of the uninformed agents. In the
resulting equilibria, the correct policy is selected in both states.
Private values In a pure private value problem, a report of −B weakly domi-
nates all other reports for a 0-partisan and a report of B weakly dominates all
other reports for a 1-partisan. Hence in every equilibrium every 0-partisan re-
ports −B and every 1-partisan reports B.11 It follows that the policy favored by
the larger group of partisans is always chosen in equilibrium. This leads to an in-
correct policy choice when a minority places a high enough value on one policy
and the majority places a small enough value on the other policy.
Theseresultsarestatedformallyinthefollowingproposition,whichisproved
in the appendix.
Proposition 2 Consider cost beneﬁt analysis with strategic participation and re-
porting.
(a) (Pure common values) Suppose that p0 = p1 = 0 and that at least one agent
is informed.
(i) Every strategy proﬁle in which each informed agent reports −B in
state 0 and B in state 1 and the report of each uninformed agent lies in
(0,B/|U|) is an equilibrium, whereU is the set of uninformed agents.
(ii) In every equilibrium the correct (welfare-maximizing) policy is chosen
in each state.
(b) (Pure private values) Suppose that pi = pu = 0 and that there is at least one
partisan of each type.
(i) The game has a unique equilibrium, in which every 0-partisan reports
−B and every 1-partisan reports B, and the policy chosen is the one
favored by the majority of agents.
(ii) The policy selected in the unique equilibrium differs from the correct
(welfare-maximizing) policy if
1




11Similar intuition is developed by Kalai and Kalai (2001) in a different context.
10Comparing Propositions 1 and 2, we see that cost beneﬁt analysis with truth-
ful reporting always chooses correctly for private value problems and sometimes
chooses incorrectly for common value problems, whereas cost beneﬁt analy-
sis with strategic reporting always chooses the correct policy for common value
problems and sometimes chooses incorrectly for private value problems.
Another interesting implication of Proposition 2 is that when reporting is
strategic, the individuals’ reports do not necessarily convey much information
about the individuals’ preferences. When values are private, all individuals make
extreme reports regardless of their true values for the policies. When values are
common, the game has multiple equilibria, and in at least one equilibrium the
reports of all informed agents are qualitatively correct but extreme and the re-
ports of all uninformed agents are close to zero. We comment further on this
point in Section 8.
5. Referenda
In a referendum, agents choose whether to vote and if so for which policy. The
policy that receives the most votes is selected; in the event of a tie, the pol-
icy is selected by the toss of a fair coin. Formally, each agent’s set of actions is
{φ}∪{−1,1}, where the action 1 is a vote for policy 1 and the action −1 is a vote
for policy 0. Policy 1 is selected if the sum of the actions is positive, policy 0 is
selected if the sum is negative, and each policy is selected with probability
1
2 if
the sum is zero. As in the case of cost beneﬁt analysis, we can simplify the no-
tation by letting the set of actions be {−1,0,1} and identifying the action 0 with
nonparticipation. We use the same notion of equilibrium as in our study of cost
beneﬁt analysis.
The equilibria of the referendum game are qualitatively similar both to the
equilibria of the beneﬁt cost analysis game and to the equilibria of the model
studied by Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996). In the case of pure common val-
ues, uninformed independents are pivotal only in the event that they oppose
informed agents, and thus optimally abstain. For the case of pure private val-
ues, all agents optimally vote sincerely. These conclusions are formalized in the
following proposition, which is proved in the Appendix.
Proposition 3 Consider a referendum with strategic participation and voting.
(a) (Pure common values) Suppose that p0 = p1 = 0 and that at least one agent
is informed.
(i) The strategy proﬁle in which every informed agent reports −1 in state 0
and 1 in state 1 and no uninformed agent votes is an equilibrium.
11(ii) In every equilibrium the correct (welfare-maximizing) policy is chosen
in each state.
(b) (Pure private values) Suppose that pi = pu = 0 and that there is at least one
partisan of each type.
(i) The game has a unique equilibrium, in which every 0-partisan reports
−1 and every 1-partisan reports 1, and the policy chosen is the one fa-




2 <p1 <π0/(π0+π1) or if π0/(π0+π1)<p1 <
1
2.
This result shows that referenda always arrive at the correct policy decision in
common value environments and sometimes make incorrect decisions in pri-
vate value environments. Incorrect decisions in private value environments re-
sult when, for example, many 0-partisans who prefer policy to 0 to policy 1 only
weakly are able to outvote a few 1 partisans who strongly prefer policy 1 to policy
0.
The result is closely related to a result of Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996).12
Feddersen and Pesendorfer deﬁne a referendum to “fully aggregate information”
if it results in the same outcome as would result from sincere voting by an elec-
torate in which all independents know the state of the world. They ﬁnd that as
the electorate becomes large, the probability that a referendum fully aggregates
information approaches one, a result that occurs, in part, because uninformed
agents have an incentive to abstain. Because of the different way in which we
have formulated our model, our result holds for all population sizes, not only
asymptotically.
That uninformed agents are less likely to vote than informed agents also has
empiricalsupport. Forexample,WolﬁngerandRosenstone(1980)ﬁndthatmore
educatedindividualsaremorelikelytovote, andMilliganetal.(2004)ﬁndthatin
the US more educated citizens are more likely to vote (although the effect is less
strong in the UK). Assuming that more educated agents are better informed, this
evidence is consistent with better-informed agents’ being more likely to vote.
Lassen(2005)ﬁndsmoredirectevidencethatvotersarebetterinformedthan
non-voters. He examines a natural experiment in Copenhagen in which city res-
idents were asked to vote in a referendum to decentralize municipal service pro-
vision. He ﬁnds that residents who were better informed about the proposal,
by virtue of living in arbitrarily selected pilot districts, were more likely to vote
12See also Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998), and Feddersen
and Pesendorfer (1999).
12than other residents. Further, the effect is substantial: by one estimate, being
informed increased the propensity to vote by 20 percentage points.
While strategic abstention by uninformed independents has not to our
knowledge been observed in laboratory experiments, similar strategic behavior
has been observed. In particular, Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) and Ladha et al.
(2003)conductedexperimentsinwhichsmallgroupsofsubjects(3and6)played
a common value majority rule voting game. Both ﬁnd evidence for strategic vot-
ingbehaviorofthesortpredictedbyAusten-SmithandBanks(1996)andFedder-
sen and Pesendorfer (1998). Wit (1999) also conducted an experimental analysis
of a common value election (also with small groups) and ﬁnds that elections are
quite effective at aggregating dispersed information.
In sum, our results, other theoretical results, empirical studies, and labora-
tory experiments all suggest that elections can be effective at aggregating infor-
mation.
6. Cost beneﬁt analysis vs. referenda
Wecannowcomparecostbeneﬁtanalysiswithreferenda. Undertheassumption
that the subjects of a cost beneﬁt analysis behave naively, the result of the cost
beneﬁt decision rule is given by Proposition 1: in private value environments
this institution always arrives at the correct decision whereas in some common
value environments it makes incorrect decisions. The outcome of a referendum
is described by Proposition 3: in common value environments referenda always
choose correctly whereas in private value environments they may choose incor-
rectly. These results lead immediately to the conclusion that, if the subjects of
a cost beneﬁt analysis behave naively, then cost beneﬁt analysis is strictly bet-
ter than referenda for private value environments, whereas referenda are strictly
better than cost beneﬁt analysis for common value environments.
The conclusion is different if the subjects of a cost beneﬁt analysis behave
strategically. In this case, comparing Proposition 2 with Proposition 3, we see
that the two decision rules lead to exactly the same decisions in both common
and private value environments. When reporting strategically in a private value
environment, all agents report the largest or smallest possible report. Thus the
realized reports are identical, except for their names, with those realized in a ref-
erendum. Theincentiveforagentstostrategicallymis-reporttheirprivatevalues
in a cost beneﬁt analysis prevents the analyst from learning any cardinal infor-
mation about their preferences; only ordinal information, which is also revealed
by a referendum, is obtained. When reporting strategically in a common value
environment, informed and uninformed agents face similar incentives in refer-
13enda and cost beneﬁt analyses. Uninformed agents generally do not want to be
pivotal, whereas informed agents do. The larger strategy sets in a cost beneﬁt
analysis generate more equilibria than exist for a referendum, but all these equi-
libria lead to perfect information aggregation.
7. Implications for travel cost and hedonic methods
Like stated preference methods, revealed preference methods (e.g. travel cost
andhedonicmethods)seektoestimateagents’willingnesstopayforaparticular
policy. Revealed preference methods are based on observed behavior, which is
not plausibly chosen to inﬂuence the outcome of a cost beneﬁt analysis. There-
fore when comparing a revealed preference cost beneﬁt analysis with a referen-
dum, it is surely not correct to assume strategic reporting of the sort assumed in
Proposition 2.
In the case of private value decisions it is probably reasonable to assume that
a skillful revealed preference cost beneﬁt analysis using the travel cost or hedo-
nic method will lead to a decision that corresponds to the prediction of Propo-
sition 1. The private value environment corresponds closely to the econometric
environment in which these methods are intended to operate and the private
values of our theory correspond closely to the preferences these methods are in-
tended to estimate.
In the case of common value decisions it is less clear that we should expect
a revealed preference cost beneﬁt analysis to lead to decisions consistent with
Proposition 1—that is, to sometimes fail to arrive at a correct decision. If cost
beneﬁt analyses based on revealed and stated preference data are to agree in
common value environments, revealed preference data must reﬂect the deci-
sions of uninformed agents who act on the basis of imperfect information that
is sometimes incorrect. In some cases, the data plausibly do so. For example,
individuals surely choose recreation destinations when they are uncertain about
how they value these destinations, and it seems reasonable that this uncertainty
leads to estimates of destination values that reﬂect the individuals’ expected val-
ues of these destinations, as required by Proposition 1. In other cases, it is less
clear that revealed preference data reﬂect the appropriate information. For ex-
ample,individualsmakehousingchoiceswhentheyareuncertainoftheirvalues
for nearby amenities, but it is unclear how such uncertainty translates into the
pricesthattheseindividualspayfortheirhousing. Insum,itseemsreasonableto
expect our theory of stated preference cost beneﬁt analysis to extend to revealed
preference cost beneﬁt analysis in private value environments, and possibly also
in common value environments.
148. Conclusion
The clarity of the language with which legislators, regulators, and professional
economists call for calculations of the economic costs and beneﬁts of policy de-
cisions conceals the difﬁculty of such calculations. In response to this difﬁculty,
the US Congressional Budget Ofﬁce has issued guidelines on how to perform a
cost beneﬁt analysis (United States Ofﬁce of Management and Budget, 2003), as
has at least one panel of distinguished economists (Arrow et al., 1996). Both sets
of instructions implicitly adopt the standard, now widespread in the profession,
thatacostbeneﬁtanalysisisgoodifitproducesanaccurateestimateofthecosts
and beneﬁts of the policy in question.
We propose a different standard: a cost beneﬁt analysis is good or bad ac-
cording to whether it leads to a better public decision than competing decision
rules. With this standard in mind, we compare a stylized cost beneﬁt decision
rule with a referendum, another widely used institution for making public deci-
sions.
Our conclusions depend sensitively on the extent to which agents behave
strategically in their interactions with the analyst performing the cost beneﬁt
analysis.
Undertheassumptionoftruthfulreporting, acostbeneﬁtanalysiselicitscar-
dinal information about preferences whereas a referendum elicits only ordinal
information. If this cardinal information is important, then cost beneﬁt analysis
leads to a better decision than does a referendum. Conversely, a referendum can
aggregatewidely-dispersedinformation,whereascostbeneﬁtanalysissimplyre-
covers a common prior. If information about the state of the world is important,
then a referendum leads to a better decision than does a cost beneﬁt analysis.
This logic leads to the conclusion that a cost beneﬁt analysis is superior to a ref-
erendum in private value environments and inferior in common value environ-
ments.
For a cost beneﬁt analysis conducted with a stated preference methodology,
it is of interest to examine the implications of strategic responses to survey ques-
tions. When agents participate and report strategically, a cost beneﬁt analysis
and a referendum elicit qualitatively identical behavior, and the two methods
always result in the same policy choice. Thus, if we believe that agents behave
strategically in cost beneﬁt analyses, there is no reason to prefer one decision
rule over the other.
Having said this, there are two reasons to believe that the widely maintained
assumption of truthful reporting in stated preference cost beneﬁt analyses is
more reasonable than the assumption of strategic behavior. First, stated pref-
erence surveys are not generally administered with the same solemnity as are
15referenda, and the link between survey responses and outcomes is more subject
to doubt than in the case of a referendum. Thus, it is probably not reasonable to
expect the same degree of strategic behavior from people participating in a cost
beneﬁt analysis as from those participating in a referendum. Second, if agents
respond strategically to stated preference cost beneﬁt analyses, from Proposi-
tion 2 we ought to observe only extreme reports in any stated preference survey
conducted in a private value environment. That this pattern of responses is not
widely observed suggests that either private value environments or strategic be-
havior is rare. Third, even if we suspect strategic behavior in stated preference
cost beneﬁtanalyses, it isimplausible to suspectsuch behaviorin travel costand
hedonic cost beneﬁt analyses. Therefore, if strategic responses to stated prefer-
ence surveys are common, we ought to see systematic differences in the conclu-
sions of analyses based on revealed and stated preferences. The survey of many
revealed and stated preference cost beneﬁt analyses in Carson et al. (1996) does
not support this conclusion.
Without taking a stand on whether agents approach stated preference cost
beneﬁt analyses strategically, we can make a strong statement about the com-
parative advantages of the two decision rules: cost beneﬁt analyses are always
at least as good as referenda for private value problems, whereas referenda are
always at least as good as cost beneﬁt analyses for common value problems. If
our skepticism about strategic behavior in cost beneﬁt analyses is warranted, a
stronger statement is possible: cost beneﬁt analyses are strictly better than refer-
enda for private value problems, whereas referenda are strictly better than cost
beneﬁt analyses for common value problems.
Our results suggest that a determination of whether or not to rely on refer-
enda or cost beneﬁt analyses for any given public decision depends on whether
valuations are private or common. This question appears to be difﬁcult to an-
swer ex ante for any given public decision. However, the fundamental differ-
encebetweenprivatevalueandcommonvalueenvironmentsisthatpreferences
in common value environments change systematically after a policy decision is
taken, whereas preferences in private value decisions do not. This suggests the
possibility of distinguishing common value from private value decisions ex post.
In principal, a collection of studies performed ex ante and ex post on different
public decisions could allow regulators to determine classes of public decisions
where common values are important and where they are not. This information
would, in turn, allow a determination of when referenda should be expected to
outperform cost beneﬁt analyses and when they should not.
169. Appendix
In the proofs, an equivalent version of our deﬁnition of an equilibrium (Deﬁni-
tion 1) is useful. Consider a player choosing between two strategies that gener-
ate the same payoff given the other players’ strategies. When ε is small, for any
positive integer k, the effect on the player’s expected payoff of the involuntary
nonparticipation of k +1 or more players is negligible compared with the effect
oftheinvoluntarynonparticipationofk players. Therefore,therequirementthat
aplayer’sstrategybeabestresponsetotheotherplayers’strategiesforallsmallε
means that the player’s choice between the strategies is based on the case of the
involuntary nonparticipation by the smallest number of players for which the
expected payoffs of the strategies differ. If, for example, the player’s strategies rj
and r 0
j yield her the same expected payoff when all players participate and also
over all the cases in which one of the other players involuntarily does not partici-
pate, but the expected payoff of rj over all cases in which two of the other players
involuntarily do not participate is higher than the expected payoff of r 0
j in this
case, then she chooses rj.
Precisely, a useful implication of our deﬁnition of equilibrium is that
a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium if and only if for each agent and
each change in her strategy, one of the following conditions is satis-
ﬁed:
• For every integer k with 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, the change does not
affect her expected payoff when each set of k nonparticipants
is equally-likely.
• For the smallest integer k for which the change does affect her
expected payoff when each set of k nonparticipants is equally-
likely, it decreases this expected payoff.
Proposition 2 Consider cost beneﬁt analysis with strategic participation and
reporting.
(a) (Pure common values) Suppose that p0 =p1 =0 and that at least one agent
is informed.
(i) Every strategy proﬁle in which each informed agent reports −B in
state0and B instate1andthereportofeachuninformedagentliesin
(0,B/|U|) is an equilibrium, whereU is the set of uninformed agents.
(ii) In every equilibrium the correct (welfare-maximizing) policy is cho-
sen in each state.
17(b) (Pure private values) Suppose that pi =pu =0 and that there is at least one
partisan of each type.
(i) Thegamehasauniqueequilibrium,inwhichevery0-partisanreports
−B and every 1-partisan reports B, and the policy chosen is the one
favored by the majority of agents.







Proof. (ai) The outcome of any such strategy proﬁle is policy 1 in state 1 and
policy 0 in state 0. This outcome is the best possible outcome for every agent, so
no deviation can improve any agent’s payoff when all agents participate.
Nowconsideraperturbationofthegameinwhichsomeagentsdonotpartic-
ipate. If at least one informed agent participates, the outcome is policy 1 in state
1 and policy 0 in state 0. If only uninformed agents participate, the outcome is
policy 1. In both cases, the outcome is the best possible outcome for every par-
ticipant (given that α, the prior probability of state 0, is less than
1
2), so that no
deviation by any agent increases her payoff. Thus any such strategy proﬁle is an
equilibrium.
(aii) We ﬁrst argue that in every equilibrium, every informed agent’s report is
positive in state 1 and negative in state 0.
Suppose to the contrary that the report of some informed agent j in state 0
is nonnegative. Then if no other agent participates, the outcome is policy 1 if j’s
report is positive and each policy with probability
1
2 if j’s report is 0. Thus a de-
viation by j to −B improves the outcome (to policy 0) in state 0 if no other agent
participates and either improves the outcome or does not affect the outcome for
any other set of reports. Thus every informed agent’s report in state 0 is negative
in any equilibrium. Similarly every informed agent’s report in state 1 is positive
in any equilibrium.
Now consider the behavior of uninformed agents. Let r be a strategy proﬁle








be the sum of the reports in state z, where I is the set of informed agents and
U is the set of uninformed agents. Assume that the outcome in state 1 is not
correct, so that R(1) ≤ 0. By the previous argument, rj(1) > 0 and rj(0) < 0 for
every j ∈ I. Thus R(0) < R(1), R(0) < 0, and rj < 0 for some j ∈U. Denote by m
the uninformed agent for whom rm is smallest (or any such agent if there is more
than one such agent). (That is, rm <0 and rm ≤rj for all j ∈U.)
18We claim that there is an alternative report r 0
m for agent m and a nonnegative
integer k such that a deviation by m to r 0
m does not affect the outcome if fewer
than k other agents do not participate and increases m’s expected payoff over all
cases in which k other agents do not participate.
First suppose that rm − R(1) < B. Choose δ > 0 such that rm − R(1) + δ ≤
B and δ < R(1) − R(0). Then m can deviate to the report r 0
m = rm − R(1) + δ
(> rm), and if she does so the sum of the reports in state 1 becomes positive (it
becomes δ) while the sum of the reports in state 0 remains negative (it becomes
R(0)−R(1)+δ). Thus m’s deviation induces a better outcome, and increases her
payoff. We conclude that if rm −R(1)< B then r is not an equilibrium.
Now suppose that rm −R(1)= B. Then R(1)<0, because rm <0. If m deviates
to r 0
m = B, the sum of the reports becomes R(1)−rm +B =0 in state 1 and R(0)−
rm+B <R(1)−rm+B =0. Thustheoutcomeimprovesbecausethepolicychosen
in state 1 changes from 0 to a 50–50 mixture of 0 and 1 while the policy chosen in
state 0 remains 0. Hence r is not an equilibrium.
Finally suppose that rm −R(1) > B. In this case, if all agents participate, no
deviationbym—evenadeviationto B—affectstheoutcomeineitherstate. Thus
to determine whether r is an equilibrium we need to consider the consequences
of agents not participating. Suppose that one agent does not participate. Denote
by j the agent for whom rj is smallest among the agents other than m. The sum
of the reports when j does not participate is R(1) − rj. Given that rj ≥ rm, we
have R(1)−rj ≤ R(1)−rm < −B < 0 (given rm −R(1) > B). That is, when j does
not participate, the sum of the reports in state 1 (and therefore also the sum in
state 0) remains negative.
There are two cases to consider. If rm −R(1)+rj ≤ B, then by the arguments
in the previous two paragraphs, if agent j does not participate, agent m has a de-
viation that changes the outcome to either policy 1 or a 50–50 mixture of the two
policies in state 1 and retains policy 0 in state 0, thus increasing her payoff. Fur-
ther, the report of every other agent is at least rj, so when any other single agent
does not participate this deviation either increases m’s payoff or has no effect on
the outcome. Thus if rm −R(1)+rj ≤ B then m has a deviation that increases her
expected payoff over all cases in which one agent does not participate, so that
the strategy proﬁle is not an equilibrium.
If rm − R(1) + rj > B, then no deviation by agent m affects the outcome in
either state when at most one agent does not participate. In this case, we can
take the agent j 0 whose report is smallest among the agents other than m and
j, and repeat the argument of the previous paragraph for the case in which j
and j 0 do not participate. We can continue in the same way for larger sets of
nonparticipants, at each step adding the agent whose report is smallest among
the reports of the remaining agents. For each number ` of nonparticipants, one
19of the following two cases occurs.
(i) Agent m has a deviation that changes the policy from 0 to 1 (or a 50–50
mixture of 0 and 1) in state 1 and retains policy 0 in state 0 for some set (or
sets) of ` nonparticipants and does not affect the policy in either state for
other sets of ` nonparticipants. In this case r is not an equilibrium.




of all the uninformed agents except m, every participant is informed other than
m and hence (by the earlier argument) makes a positive report in state 1.
We conclude that in any equilibrium the outcome in state 1 is correct. A sim-
ilar argument shows that in any equilibrium the outcome in state 0 is correct.
(bi) First observe that if a 0-partisan whose report is greater than −B devi-
ates to −B, either the outcome does not change or it improves from the agent’s
perspective. A deviation by a 1-partisan from a report of less than B to B has a
similar effect.
To prove the result, we need to argue only that for any strategy proﬁle r in
which some 0-partisan reports more than −B or some 1-partisan reports less
than B, there is an agent m and a subsetS of the other agents such that the devi-
ation by m from rm to −B (if m is a 0-partisan) or B (if m is a 1-partisan) strictly
improves the outcome from m’s perspective when the set of nonparticipants is
S. Denote by m0 the 0-partisan whose report is largest (or any such agent in the
event of a tie) and by m1 the 1-partisan whose report is smallest. Of these two
agents, choose the one whose report deviates most from extreme report appro-
priate for her type. (That is, choose the 0-partisan if rm0 >−rm1, the 1-partisan if
rm0 < −rm1, and either in the case of equality.) Denote this agent by m, and as-
sume, without loss of generality, that she is a 0-partisan. LetS be the set of all the
other agents with the exception of a single 1-partisan, say m0. When the set of
nonparticipants isS, there are exactly two participants, m and m0. By the choice
ofm, wehaverm+rm0 ≥0and−B+rm0 ≤0, withatleastoneoftheseinequalities
strict (otherwise rm =−B and rm0 = B). Thus if m deviates to −B when the set of
nonparticipants isS, the outcome changes either from policy 1 to policy 0, from
policy 1 to a 50–50 mixture of policies 0 and 1, or from a 50–50 mixture of policies
0 and 1 to policy 0. In all cases, the deviation increases m’s payoff, so r is not an
equilibrium.
(bii) In the unique equilibrium, if p1 >
1
2 then policy 1 is selected, if p1 =
1
2 then each policy is selected with probability
1
2, and if p1 <
1
2 then policy 0 is
20selected. The welfare-maximizing policy is policy 1 if −(1−p1)π0 +p1π1 > 0, or
p1 >π0/(π0+π1),policy0ifp1 <π0/(π0+π1),andeitherpolicyifp1 =π0/(π0+π1).
The result follows immediately. 
Proposition3 Considerareferendumwithstrategicparticipationandvoting.
(a) (Pure common values) Suppose that p0 =p1 =0 and that at least one agent
is informed.
(i) The strategy proﬁle in which every informed agent reports −1 in
state 0 and 1 in state 1 and no uninformed agent votes is an equi-
librium.
(ii) In every equilibrium the correct (welfare-maximizing) policy is cho-
sen in each state.
(b) (Pure private values) Suppose that pi =pu =0 and that there is at least one
partisan of each type.
(i) Thegamehasauniqueequilibrium,inwhichevery0-partisanreports
−1 and every 1-partisan reports 1, and the policy chosen is the one




2 <p1 <π0/(π0+π1) or if π0/(π0+π1)<p1 <
1
2.
Proof. (ai) We claim that the strategy proﬁle r for which rj(0) = −1 and rj(1) = 1
if j is informed and rj =0 if she is uninformed is an equilibrium.
Theoutcomeofthisstrategyproﬁleispolicy1instate1andpolicy0instate0.
This outcome is the best possible outcome for every agent, so no deviation can
improve any agent’s payoff when all agents participate.
To show that the strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium, we need to argue that
for each agent and each change in her strategy, either for every integer k with
0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, the change does not affect her expected payoff over all the
(equally-likely) sets of k nonparticipants, or for the smallest integer k for which
the change does affect her expected payoff over all the sets of k nonparticipants,
the change decreases this expected payoff.13
13Theargumentweusetoshowthecorrespondingresultforcost-beneﬁtanalysiswithstrategic
reporting (Proposition 2) does not apply, because the outcome of the strategy proﬁle r in the
perturbed game in which no informed agents participate is not the best outcome.
21First consider an informed agent j. If she follows rj then the outcome is the
correctpolicyineachstateregardlessofthesetofnonparticipants,soanychange
in her strategy either has no effect on the outcome or makes it worse.
Now consider an uninformed agent j. If the number of nonparticipants is
|I|−2 or fewer, at least two informed agents participate, so that the difference
between the sums of reports in the two states is at least 4. Hence no change in
j’s action affects the outcome. Now suppose that the number of nonparticipants
is |I|−1. Then if j follows her strategy rj, the outcome is the right policy in each
state regardless of which |I| − 1 agents do not participate. If j deviates to −1,
eithertheoutcomedoesnotchangeineitherstateor, ifall|I|−1nonparticipants




2 mixture of policies 0 and 1 in state 1, which is worse for her. If j deviates to 1,
eithertheoutcomedoesnotchangeineitherstateor, ifall|I|−1nonparticipants





mixture of policies 0 and 1 in state 0, which also is worse for her.
We conclude that r is an equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
(aii) The argument is closely related, though not identical, to the argument
for the case of cost beneﬁt analysis.
We ﬁrst argue that in every equilibrium, every informed agent reports 1 in
state 1 and −1 in state 0.
Suppose to the contrary that rj(0) 6= −1 for some j ∈ I. Then a deviation by
j to −1 improves the outcome in state 0 if no other agent participates and either
improvestheoutcomeordoesnotaffecttheoutcomeforanyothersetofreports.
Thus rj(0)=−1 in any equilibrium. Similarly rj(1)=1 in any equilibrium.








be the sum of the reports in state z. Assume that the outcome in state 1 is not
correct, so that R(1) ≤ 0. Because at least one agent is informed and rj(1) = 1
and rj(0) = −1 for every informed agent j, we have R(1) − R(0) = 2|I| ≥ 2 and P
j∈U rj = R(1) − |I|, so that in particular at least |I| − R(1) uninformed agents
report −1. Denote by m such an uninformed agent.
If R(1) ≥ −2 then in the case that all agents participate, agent m has a devi-
ation that improves the outcome in state 1 and does not change the outcome in
state 0, so that the strategy proﬁle is not an equilibrium. (If R(1) = −2, for exam-





2 mixture of policies 0 and 1, while keeping the outcome in state 0 equal
to policy 0.)
22Now suppose that R(1) ≤ −3 and consider a deviation by m to report 1 (in-
stead of −1). If all agents participate or at most −R(1) − 3 do not participate,
this deviation does not affect the outcome in either state. Now suppose that
k = −R(1)−2 agents do not participate. Unless all of these nonparticipants are
uninformedagentsforwhomrj =−1, thedeviationbym doesnotaffecttheout-
comeineitherstate,becauseitcausesthesumofthereportsinstate1toincrease
to at most −2. If all nonparticipants are uninformed agents for whom rj(1)=−1,
the sum of the reports in state 1 when all participants follow their strategies is
R(1)−R(1)−2=−2, so that the deviation by m changes the sum of the reports to




2 mixture of the two policies.
Thus the strategy proﬁle is not an equilibrium.
Asimilarargumentshowsthatastrategyproﬁlethatgeneratesthewrongout-
come in state 0 is not an equilibrium.
(bi) The argument is the same as in the proof of part bi of Proposition 2.
(bii) The argument is the same as in the proof of part bii of Proposition 2. 
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